The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift and Its Effects on East Asia

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INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY STUDIES

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Institute for International Policy Studies 2003

PRINTED IN JAPAN
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In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, international relations have undergone profound transformation, as new coalitions have been created and old alliances have been re-evaluated. In this paper the author examines the paradigm shift which has taken place as the US seeks to establish a new world order in her fight against global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He compares the current threat perception with those that existed during the Cold War and during the 1990s. He goes on to discuss the change in the character of the relationships between the US and the EU, Russia, and China, and examines differing attitudes among allied nations to the "Axis of Evil" and the looming specter of war on Iraq. Finally, he explores the effects of this paradigm shift on East Asia, in particular on China, Taiwan, and North Korea.

1) Introduction

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are said to have “completely changed the world.” International relations are undergoing fundamental changes as evidenced by events like the formation of the anti-terrorism coalition and the remarkable improvement in US-Russia relations. The focus of international politics has also changed greatly. Washington is calling this change a “paradigm shift,” and while pushing for the continuation of the fight against terrorism, they are advancing the fight to the next step, which is removing the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The US view of the changes that have taken place since 9/11 are very different from those in other countries, as can be seen in the different assessments of the “axis of evil” statement, showing that others do not necessarily have the same threat perception as the US. Many countries are more focused on US unilateralism than on the war on terrorism.

Before criticizing the US stance as unilateralism, however, we should correctly understand the perception of the US and its citizens on the changes that have taken place since the so-called paradigm shift of 9/11. What are the special characteristics of this new paradigm in the post-9/11 era? Were the 9/11 attacks the turning point which brought the post-Cold War era to an end? Re-examining the situation may prove useful in foretelling the course of the war on terrorism.
In the international community there are two views of the unipolar position occupied by the US: the positive, which sees the new order as a Pax Americana aiming for a world without terrorism, and the negative, which regards it as a “new imperialism” and sees the dangers of the unilateral use of military force (pre-emptive) to maintain the new order. The 9/11 attacks exposed the vulnerability of the US homeland, and the US responded with a demonstration of overwhelming military strength. This forced other countries to reconsider their relationship with the US and its unparalleled military might. On the other hand, the US had to exhibit virtue, cooperation and self-restraint if it truly wanted to be the leading nation in the new order.

This report investigates the US view of the “9/11 paradigm shift,” and then takes a look at the intentions and motives of the US, Russia, China, and Europe which underlie the changes in international relations since 9/11.

This investigation is then followed by several observations on the effects of these changes on East Asia, in particular on their implications for the Taiwan problem.

2) The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift

(1) Change in US Perceptions

The term “paradigm” can be defined as “the dominant world-view of an era” or “a characteristic framework of perception or thought during a certain era or in a certain field.” Thus the term “paradigm shift” carries with it a strong connotation of a change in the times.

President Bush defined the 9/11 attacks as “a new war,” the only difference between previous wars being magnitude, and marked them as a turning point in history. Winston Churchill said, “But great battles, won or lost, change the entire course of events, create new standards of values, new moods, new atmospheres, in armies and in nations, to which all must conform.”1 From this point of view, Elliot Cohen notes that the “vivid demonstration of American vulnerability has changed atmospheres and values.”2 Similarly, James Schlesinger wrote, “What has changed domestically is a new and different focus and a rebirth of national unity, which could prove transitory,” and remarks that “We now recognize-and perhaps exaggerate-our own vulnerability to terrorism.”3

In any case, it is precisely this change in the American people’s perceptions and values that makes one conscious of this paradigm shift, this turning point in history.

How, then, should this change in the perceptions and values of the American people be taken?

This post-9/11 perception includes the destruction of the mythical security of the US mainland (its vulnerability) and the revitalization of diplomacy and security, in other words, there is a heightened awareness of the asymmetrical threat to the US mainland and US citizens. From this, it can be deduced that the perception of the “post-Cold War era paradigm” was one of US mainland security due to the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the disappearance of concerns
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relating to foreign relations and security. The post-Cold War era is an age wandering in search of a threat. The important issue here is the “sense of security” of the American people, or, stated in negative terms, the perception of “threats” and their “threat level.”

The paradigm shifts from the Cold War era onwards bear closer examination. (See Fig. 1 below.)

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Fig. 1 Paradigm shifts

The Soviet Union was a clear threat during the Cold War era, and awareness of the vulnerability to nuclear attack—the threat level—was high due to nuclear parity. The top priority of the Cold War era paradigm was to deal with the Soviet threat. The end of the Cold War, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, was responsible for a major change in the threat perception. The threat then disappeared completely when the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991. The post-Cold War era was marked by an increase in ethnic and regional religious conflicts which, in the absence of a stable bipolar structure, flourished amid the instability and uncertainty caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles. After the Cold War, collective UN security was functioning well due to US-Soviet cooperation, a multinational force patterned after the United Nations Force was formed, and the countries of the world were working together on “restoring peace,” as evidenced by the 1991 Gulf War. A “New World Order” modeled on these instances of cooperation was trumpeted by President Bush, but it never materialized. In contrast, there was a strong outcry within the US for sharing the “dividends of peace,” some forward-deployed troops were recalled, and a large reduction in forces was planned as evidenced by the 1991 Base Force plan. The threat disappeared completely.
from the national consciousness during this era. Government and military perception become quite estranged from that of the nation after the Clinton administration took office in 1992. As the result of a 1993 bottom-up review, the Department of Defense began to lay the foundation for the strategic and military resources needed to deal with potential large-scale regional conflicts in Iraq and North Korea. However, many saw this as expediency designed to maintain the current level of military strength. With the consequent failure to convince the American public of the need for these resources, public attention turned to economic recovery instead. Just as the concerns of the American public over security were receding, the instability of the post-Cold War era was becoming more evident on the international scene, causing specialists to join the chorus of government and military voices warning of “asymmetrical threats” such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Despite this, the American public was of the firm, yet mistaken, belief that such things could not happen on the US homeland. Borrowing from Schlesinger, “London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo may have been susceptible to terrorist acts, but in the public mind somehow this nation remained invulnerable.” In other words, this post-Cold War paradigm was characterized not by a perception that expressed the intrinsic qualities of a new era but by the loss of the threats and threat perceptions of the Cold War paradigm. These perceptions and values came from an unfounded sense of safety and optimism.

(2) The New Paradigm

The attacks of 9/11 showed the optimistic outlook of the 90s to be mistaken and announced that we had entered an unpredictable world. To put it another way, the 9/11 attacks were a turning point which reawakened our threat perception. In the new post-9/11 paradigm, the war on terrorism is given top priority and is based on a shared perception of unpredictable asymmetrical threats, such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The threats themselves are different, but the heightened awareness represents a return to the Cold War era. Just as dealing with the Soviet threat took top priority then, the fight against terrorism and the war on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the overarching concerns today. The global perception of the Bush administration’s foreign policy is that it is the same as that of the Cold War era. In any case, there was a consensus of support for the direction taken by the US after the 9/11 attacks, and the Bush administration’s efforts in the war on terrorism are solidly supported by the American people. This direction echoes the plans for a “new world order of the twenty-first century” drawn up by the newly inaugurated Bush administration, and the 9/11 attacks may also be looked upon as an opportunity to prepare for future US predominance through the war on terrorism.

On the other hand, the changes in government policies and countermeasures that demarcate the transition to a new era require a threat perception that is shared by the people and the government-as is required to fight a “big war,” and a sense of solidarity which can unite the nation. Thus, the 9/11 attacks can be viewed as the turning point which brought an end to the post-Cold War era in the US.
(3) Problems

The new post-9/11 paradigm is characterized by two major problems which did not exist during the Cold War era. One problem is the nature of the threat—an “unspecified enemy.” The other problem is that threat perception levels in other countries are not necessarily the same as those in the US. After 9/11, the American people are undoubtedly aware that there are enemies in their midst, but just who they are, no-one knows. If they do not nail down just who the unspecified enemy is, they will neither be able to deal with or dispel the threats, nor protect themselves through suppressive or pre-emptive actions. Another concern is that the threat perception and concern of the people will wane as time passes. The US government must continue to clarify the nature of the threat and continue to press for the understanding and support of the public in their efforts. Will the public be able to maintain the threat perception of a non-specific enemy such as terrorism, as they did with their perception of the Soviet Union? To put it another way, the Bush administration’s key to success for the long-term war on terrorism is maintenance of this threat perception. This explains the necessity for clarifying the enemy, as evidenced by statements like the “axis of evil.” The true motive behind this declaration will be discussed later, but the lack of a clear threat in the long-term war on terrorism results in a divergent evaluation of the threat in the eyes of those whom the US administration is trying to influence.

This leads on to the second problem. During the Cold War era the consensus among Western Alliance countries was that the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact countries were the enemy, yet in this post-9/11 paradigm, there is no such international consensus on the threats, other than those posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In their characterization of the enemy, the US wishes to avoid the appearance of a “Clash of Civilizations” since that would pit them against all Muslim nations and societies, a danger rendered all the more acute by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead, they position Al Qaeda and the Taliban as enemies of “civilization.” The Bush administration has expressed the view that the stamping out of terrorists in Afghanistan is no more than the first step in a long-term war on terrorism, and that this fight to save the civilized world will continue for some time. The US also held up the “Axis of Evil” (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) as the next enemies of civilized society; however, this prompted a widespread outcry which included the voices of several European countries.

Naturally, differences in perception between countries will be affected by the ability of the US to sell them on the selected enemy. However, to a large extent the differences are determined by the threat perception within a given country. Thus, considerable divergence is apparent between different countries in their post-9/11 threat perceptions and their views on the US response.

Certainly the 9/11 attacks shocked the entire world and triggered some kind of paradigm shift in every country. However, this latest paradigm shift has not necessarily resulted in a situation akin to that of the Cold War era, when the US paradigm was the model on which others were patterned. Unilateralism notwithstanding, if the Bush administration does not keep this fact in mind, its own plans for a new US-led world order may fail.
3) Post-9/11 Changes in International Relations

(1) The Bush Doctrine and the Bandwagon Effect

Initially, countries other than the US thought that the 9/11 attacks would force the US to abandon unilateralism for multilateralism. In fact, the US devoted all its efforts to forming a coalition of governments which was designed to win the war on terrorism, and dramatically improved relations with Russia, several Central Asian countries, India, Pakistan, and various other countries. Yet, President Bush’s invitation to join the coalition to fight terrorism was a half-threat couched in terms of the dualist proposition “you’re either with us or against us, Good or Evil.” This has become the foreign policy foundation of the Bush administration and is echoed in The National Security Strategy of the United States, also called the “Bush Doctrine.” Incidentally, the new Bush Doctrine clearly states that the US reserves the right to pre-emptive and independent action in the war on terrorism.

Against this backdrop of cooperation by the global coalition against terrorism, the US war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda—the war on terror in Afghanistan—proved many pessimistic predictions wrong when the Taliban government was broken in a mere two-and-a-half months. Although Bin Laden has yet to be apprehended and the pursuit of the remaining Al Qaeda forces continues, the US war is viewed as a great success, and the US military has shown the world both its overwhelming military superiority and, of particular note, the astonishing effectiveness of its precision guided weaponry.

Kandahar, the Taliban’s last stronghold, fell on December 7. One week later, on December 13, the US declared their unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and announced this fact to their partner in the war on terror, Russia. In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush said, “the war on terror has just begun,” hinting at the expansion of that war. He also pointed to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as supporters of terrorism who possessed or sought weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and branded them the “Axis of Evil.” As part of the war on terror US troops were in fact deployed to the Philippines, Georgia, and Yemen.

As the US expressed its readiness to expand the war on terror, success in the Afghan war boosted their confidence but also brought accusations of a return to unilateralism.

However, despite these criticisms, and through its experience in the construction of an anti-terrorism coalition, the US probably learned that it can achieve the so-called bandwagon effect through a strong show of resolve and force. They were led to this conclusion by several factors: the 9/11 terror attacks resulted in improved relations with Russia and China, and both countries acquiesced to the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, in deed if not in word; NATO and Australia exercised their right to collective self-defense for the first time; India, Pakistan, and several countries in Central Asia supported the US; and Japan stepped outside its post-war security policy framework to establish the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law. Richard Perle indicated that one source of the bandwagon effect was the mutual benefit perceived by alliance countries. Perle said, “For purposes of fighting terror, the things that we are asking most of our
coalition partners to do are things that it is very much in their interest to do. And I think they will go on giving us that sort of assistance to the extent that it is in their interest, and whether we choose to take action against Saddam will not discourage them from pursuing those interests.”

Undoubtedly, the root of the bandwagon effect is mutual benefit. Yet many say the proof of US military superiority in the Afghan war amplified the bandwagon effect. Some believe this explains why both China and Russia, vehemently outspoken on the US abandonment of the ABM treaty prior to 9/11, presented a restrained response to the one-sided US declaration that it would abandon the treaty.

(2) US Foreign Policy-Behind the “Axis of Evil” Declaration

The first stage of the US war on terror encompassed not only military objectives, but also international cooperation in the diplomatic, economic, and legislative spheres, with the aim of annihilating the terrorist network. In order to interrupt the flow of funding to terrorists, accounts thought to be a source of terrorist funds would have to be frozen all over the world, and the legal cooperation of every country would be necessary to investigate and arrest terrorists in an organization which spanned the globe. It also goes without saying that dealing with the problem of poverty in developing countries, a hotbed of terrorism, would require an international effort.

The Bush administration stated that the war on terror was a long-term war and clearly expressed its intention to widen the war in its next stage to include the eradication of the threat of weapons of mass destruction from countries which support terrorism. However, the Bush administration has yet to decide if it will use military force to topple the oppressive regimes in the “Axis of Evil.” How the Bush administration prosecutes this war will be affected by factors at home and abroad. However, an important indicator in predicting the direction of the war on terrorism is whether or not the perception of the new post-9/11 paradigm will continue—In other words, whether or not the war will continue to have the support of the American people.

The Bush administration categorizes countries as “Axis” countries based on their involvement in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In his State of the Union address, President Bush clearly states that the second stage of the war on terror will go beyond the destruction of the terror network responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and will seek to eradicate the threat of attack to the US and its allies by terrorists or nations using weapons of mass destruction. Considering again the relationship of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, technological cooperation and trade related to the development of ballistic missiles has occasionally been pointed out. There also seems to be a link in the development of nuclear weapons. In fact, it is thought that North Korea uses money raised through the sale of ballistic missiles to Iran and Iraq in its development projects. In other words, this link involving the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is viewed as the “Axis.” The US objective is to destroy weapons of mass destruction and the ability to produce them in countries which support terrorism. This means that the “Axis of Evil” brand is not limited to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. All countries feared to be scheming to acquire weapons of mass destruction will probably be added to this group later on. Taking this one step further, might this also be considered as a message to Russia and China, who are
seen as the largest distributors of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles? Coincidentally, the Nuclear Posture Review was released on 8 January 2002, and a top-secret section of it that was leaked to the media (the US government has refused to validate its authenticity) indicates that Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are mentioned as targets. Combined with the State of the Union address, this sends a clear message of US resolve to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To digress temporarily, the US branded North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the “Axis of Evil,” not because it wants to neutralize weapons of mass destruction, but because it wants to overthrow the oppressive regimes of these countries as the root of the problem. From this perspective, one might say that the US simply wants to threaten them. The US government has stated as its ultimate objective the toppling of these oppressive regimes, and although they may not necessarily take immediate military action, they have at the very least made it clear that they do not favor long-term co-existence with these governments. It appears that the Bush administration has made this an objective which they must achieve, even if it takes a long time, just as it took the US a long time to win the Cold War. However, we must keep in mind the objective of defense policy as propounded in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, submitted to congress on 30 September 2001: “Decisively defeating any enemy if deterrence fails . . . . Such a decisive defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until US strategic objectives are met.” Since the military strategy clearly calls for the defeat of enemy regimes, one might say that the above is more than just a threat. Iraq is the most likely target at present, but we cannot exclude the possibility of a pre-emptive US strike directed at North Korea or Iran depending on the situation.

In any case, what one can say is that the US emphasis has shifted from the punishment of the ringleaders of the 9/11 attacks to the elimination of potential threats involving weapons of mass destruction. The focus of the European states, which look at the “Axis of Evil” statement as an “oversimplification,” is on the punishment of the 9/11 ringleaders. The most common criticism heard is that if the US intends to attack Iraq, then it must show a clear connection between Iraq and terrorism. If the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is left unchecked, an attack more terrible than 9/11 may occur. The Bush administration thinks it important to stamp out potential threats before they have a chance to materialize.

From the perspective of a “paradigm shift,” the “Axis of Evil” statement could be said to represent a major change in US strategic objectives—from “maintaining the status quo” of the post-Cold War era to “changing the status quo” in the name of “building peace.”
(3) Improved US-Russia Relations-Russia’s True Motives

On 24 May 2002, the “US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty” was concluded in Moscow. This treaty does away with a strategic relationship based on the concept of mutually assured destruction. In the words of President Bush, this treaty “reflects a clean and clear break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War,” and thus symbolizes a change in US-Russia relations from one of antagonism to one of cooperation. Then, on 28 May 2002, the “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality (Rome Declaration)” was signed, establishing the new NATO-Russia Council, which put Russia and NATO alliance countries on an even footing in the decision-making process on nine issues, including the war on terrorism, crisis management, and the non-proliferation problem. At the Kananaskis Summit on June 26 and 27 2002, it was confirmed that Russia would become a full member of the G8 by 2006.

This series of events represents a set of major concessions to US demands and is considered to be the result of a change in Russian foreign policy, one that places top priority on cooperation with the US. President Putin’s post-9/11 decisions are certainly notable for their favorable posture in relation to US demands. However, in order to understand the underlying reasons for this shift in President Putin’s policy, one must go back to the time before 9/11. The basis for President Putin’s negotiations with the US is believed to be his November 2000 declaration, in which he first publicly hints at his willingness to discuss missile defenses with the US. Later, at two US-Russia summit meetings in June and July prior to the 9/11 attacks, Russia again indicated a willingness to cooperate and agreed to comprehensive discussions on the ABM Treaty and a reduction of strategic forces. Behind this move was the fact that, without reductions in US strategic forces, Russia could not maintain nuclear parity with the US. Russia wanted to at least maintain the illusion of nuclear parity with the US, and thus needed the US to guarantee its position as a nuclear power-its one remaining sphere of international influence.

From this perspective, President Putin skillfully used the 9/11 attacks to sell his new strategic policy domestically, and 9/11 was not necessarily the reason for the change in foreign policy. Underneath President Putin’s forthright stance was the desire to restore Russia to her former greatness. According to himself and others, President Putin is a pragmatist and is fully aware that restoring Russia to her former glory will require the support and financial cooperation of western countries, particularly the US. In the end, President Putin successfully leveraged 9/11, not only to pull in western financial aid, but also to put Russia back on the political map. This new Russian stance is a double-edged sword, however, as reconstruction of the Russian economy through US-Russia cooperation will also give a boost to the renovation of the Russian army. We must not forget that the objective of renovation of the Russian military is to put it back on par with the US.

On the other hand, the US viewed building a new relationship with Russia as the final scene in the ending of the Cold War, in which Russia is no longer a threat but just another one of the great powers of the world. Naturally, on the surface they treated Russia as one of the great powers, in keeping with President Putin’s wishes, and pushed policies that guaranteed Russia’s standing as such (formal inclusion in the G8, et cetera).
The US-Russia relationship in the war on terrorism is considered as still being in its honeymoon phase. Although it may seem that way, both are in fact serving their own national interests. They share the common concern of a rising China, and they are allied, but with differing objectives.

(4) Improved US-China Relations—China’s True Motives

After the 9/11 attacks, China quickly announced its cooperation with the US in fighting terrorism, paving the way to improved Sino-US relations. Although the top US priority was fighting terrorism, the US still shelved all other problems to enable Bush to make his October visit to China as planned. Even at the closed APEC meeting in Shanghai, cooperation with anti-terrorist efforts was approved. As shown here, the 9/11 attacks were a prime opportunity for China to shore up US relations, which had been growing increasingly bad since the beginning of the Bush administration.

Internal problems with separatists in the Xinjiang-Uigur autonomous region and other areas underlie China’s decision to join the war on terrorism. Using the war on terrorism to assume the moral high ground, China obtains international recognition of these separatist movements as terrorists and mitigates criticism of her human rights abuses. Geopolitically of course, the power of Islamic extremist factions is growing, and instability in Central Asia and South Asia threatens China’s security.

Another important point is China’s awareness of her relative lack of national power compared to the US. At this point in time, China knows that it would be impossible to defeat the US. Moreover, sustained economic growth is necessary in order to increase national strength, and stable international relations are necessary to achieve that goal. Thus, at present, maintaining stable relations with the US is a matter of life and death for China.

(5) The Paradox of US-EU Relations—The EU’s True Motives

After the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked the right to collective self-defense for the first time since its foundation. However, NATO forces did not play a role in the ensuing anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, and each country in the alliance participated according to its interests. Underlying this situation is US progress in the revolution in military affairs. This progress has created a gap in the military capabilities of the US and EU countries which prevents all but the UK from undertaking joint military operations with the US. The second enlargement of NATO will take place in November 2002, and while the Alliance’s joint security will be augmented in political terms, NATO’s role as a military organization remains shaky.

The US reaffirmed the importance of European cooperation after the 9/11 attacks; however, Europe’s main role is in peace-building operations after the war, and this may become the model (the Afghan model) for the division of duties in future US-EU relations. For the EU countries, acceptance of this situation is humiliating, and it is expected that they will want to close the technology and capability gap with the US. However, ever since the end of the Cold
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War, the general public in EU countries has been clamoring for a distribution of the benefits of peace. Persuading them to appreciate the need to match the US in defense spending will be difficult.

Since the disappearance of the threat at the end of the Cold War, there have been differences of opinion between the US and EU over new duties, such as crisis management missions. Before the new threat of terrorism, there was strong group unity, but not necessarily agreement on threat identification. This disagreement created some friction over the second stage of the war on terror and the US objective of eradication of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This can be seen in France and Germany in particular; however, it is questionable whether criticism of US unilateralism will have any effect on US decision-making. In the end, even if the EU decides to remain in step with the US, it will in the process make great efforts to remind the US of the importance of EU cooperation.

4) Influence on East Asia

(1) Influence of Anti-Terrorism

In the short term, the war on terrorism has caused US priorities to shift towards the war itself; in the long term, the war on terrorism will force attention to be focused on changes in the strategic environment brought about by the anti-terrorism coalition.

Prior to 9/11, the main concern of the US was the rise of China. However, after 9/11, all problems in Asia are viewed through the lens of the war on terrorism. US short-term interests lie in the annihilation of the Al Qaeda terrorist network. In Asia too, the US has deployed military advisors to assist in stamping out the Philippine-based Abu Sayef group. They continue to support this operation materially in the form of joint Philippine-US military exercises. This gives the US a head start in reviving US military bases in the Philippines as part of its effort to create multiple points of access.

This change in the nature of the US presence in the region has both mid- and long-term implications. After 9/11, US-Russia relations improved dramatically through the formation of the anti-terrorism coalition, and US influence in India and Pakistan grew. In addition, the strategic environment changed as the US stationed troops in Central Asia, China’s own backyard. This series of events could be seen by China as a mid- to long-term plan by the US to box China in. Although the 9/11 attacks have resulted in improved US-China relations, China is becoming ever more cautious.

As if to confirm China’s fears, a series of reports were released which clearly portray China as the main focus of US mid- and long-term planning. These reports included the QDR 2001, released in September 2001, the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, released in July 2002, the Annual Report to the President and Congress, released in August 2002, and The National Security Strategy of the United States, released in September 2002. Viewed in the context of US-China relations, the US may see this cooperation in the war on terror as an adjustment period in which to build a new US-led world order that brooks no rivals, while China may view it as a grace period in which to catch up with the US.
(2) Influence on the Situation in Iraq

Following the Afghan war, the focus has turned to the problem of the US and its intention to topple the government of Saddam Hussein. The discussion in the US has moved from whether to attack, to when and how. Internationally, there is much maneuvering over the justness of the attack (what the reasons for it are) and the procedure (whether a new UN resolution is required). If the US were to attack Iraq, the biggest question is whether or not “pre-emptive action” in the pursuit of self-defense, as propounded in the newly released document The National Security Strategy of the United States, can be used as the basis for an attack. What are the legal ramifications for international law of the new “pre-emptive” concept established by the US, and will this “pre-emptive action” be permitted to serve as a rationale for other countries? This could have particularly dire consequences for countries involved in conflicts.

What is clear from the Bush Doctrine described earlier is that it is possible that the US will abandon the status quo strategy and embark on a plan of reform in the interests of building peace. The significance of this development, which also hangs on the success or failure of the effort to oust Saddam Hussein, is in how it influences the posture of the US against oppressive governments in those nations it labels the members of the “Axis of Evil.”

How other nations will react in the post-Saddam era is also of interest. If the UN and countries other than the US take the lead in building peace, much like as in Afghanistan, this division of labor may become the peace-building model for the new order.

(3) Influence on the North Korean Situation

The Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea contains strong demands for concessions and is uncompromising in the extreme. Even if US-North Korea talks resume, North Korea has only two choices: abandon the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in exchange for self-preservation, or risk its regime in a showdown with the US. They have at least until the resolution of the Iraq problem to decide, but stalling for time in negotiations and fanning the flames of crisis with brinkmanship, as they have done in the past, will no longer fly with the Bush administration. The US keeps military action as the last option, but it has made it clear that the Kim Jong Il regime is unacceptable, and no matter what Kim decides to do, the possibility of a US attack will not be removed completely.

Taking advantage of Prime Minister Koizumi’s September visit to Pyongyang, the US decided to send along a special US envoy and also made other overtures to re-open the dialog with North Korea. While many believe that this signifies that there is little chance of a pre-emptive US strike on North Korea, since the war on terror has become the top US priority post-9/11, one cannot dismiss the possibility of a shift in policy from one of maintaining the status quo to one of reform. Opposition from neighboring countries will be fielded persuasively in expectation of the bandwagon effect, while the Afghan model may be applied to the problem of the post-war order. These options naturally hinge on a successful outcome to the building of a post-Saddam order after the Iraq war; however, the possibility that a wildly successful outcome will in fact increase the chances of an attack on North Korea must also be considered.
(4) Implications for the Taiwan Problem

Although US-China relations improved after the 9/11 attacks, China has not changed her policy towards Taiwan, nor can any changes be seen in the Bush administration’s policy. However, considering the US-China power relationship and the policy priorities of both countries, there is very little possibility of any major change in the Taiwan situation in the short term. In the mid- and long-term, on the other hand, if China chooses to compete with the US, the possibility of a clash at some point is high. This of course depends on China’s economic development, on her military build-up, and on how the nation performs. If, however, China chooses the path of mutual prosperity, even if it entails certain restrictions on its military strength, the power relationships with other actors could change dramatically, thus altering the entire dynamic structure of the region. In either case, Taiwan will doubtless be the focal point of these changes. Thus, in the light of the above points, a discussion of the possible approaches which China may take regarding Taiwan is warranted.

Some commentators maintain that, against the backdrop of improved US-China relations since 9/11, and while the US is preoccupied with terrorism and the Middle East (that is to say, Iraq), China should take the opportunity to mount an offensive for peace with Taiwan. It is unlikely that China will bend on its basic principles; however, she may take a harmonious approach which places importance on discussion. China’s objective is to prevent US intervention, and it would be wise for her to focus on efforts to create an environment which restrains open US intervention.

In contrast, the US may use its newly prescribed concept of “pre-emptive action” to justify use of military force in Taiwan. China, for her part, is taking great pains to remove any political justification for US intervention by provoking Taiwan, goading it into declaring independence, and employing other similar tactics. Yet, it is unlikely that the US will fall for this sort of ploy, and it would probably become involved in some way.

After witnessing the overwhelming US military superiority in the Afghan war, China has no other option than to pursue a build-up of her war potential with an emphasis on asymmetrical warfare.
5) Conclusions

It has been one year since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and although the perception of this event as the end of one era and the beginning of the next remains, the memory of the threat of terrorism is fading as people return to a more peaceful life. This difference in threat perception is responsible for the different evaluations of the new order sought by the US.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US began, with the full support of the American people, to push in earnest for a new US-led order. That effort became none other than adoption of the role of “world policeman” which the US had abandoned after the end of the Cold War. However, even though the US will not permit others to attain the same level of power, this does not change the world system, which is built of autonomous states. There are indeed threats from non-state actors such as Al Qaeda; however, as long as there is no radical change in the world system, it is clear that there are natural limits to the US capacity to act as the self-acknowledged world policeman. To deal effectively with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the threat perception of each country must be brought to the same level. Furthermore, in order for the US to effectively exercise its role as world policeman, the understanding of each nation will be necessary. The US is aware of this, and if it raises its ethical standards, as befitting a nation guided by truth, it is entirely possible that the new order for the twenty-first century will be a strong order of cooperating nations led by the US. International politics are never ideal, however, and we must not neglect to plan for various contingencies.
Notes

2 Ibid., p.13
4 Ibid., p.16
5 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Seal of the President of the United States, September 2002
7 The leaked information appeared first in the 9 March edition of the Los Angeles Times, and by 15 March there was an excerpt on the website of Global Security, a US think-tank.
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