1. The Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany, and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) of Harvard University, USA, held a joint meeting on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament in Tokyo on 4-5 March 1999, and agreed on a Joint Proposal, which you will find in the following pages.


2. Following the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May last year, nuclear proliferation, which was a matter for concern, has become a reality, even after the end of the Cold War, and a dark shadow has fallen over the peace and security of the world. As we look toward the future of mankind in the twenty-first century, with the aim of building a peaceful world, issues relating to security, which is the foundation for economic prosperity and a peaceful, stable political order, and particularly the problems of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament, require our urgent attention.

 

3. In this situation, nongovernment research institutions have an important role to play, especially research institutions from Japan and Germany, countries that hold firm non-nuclear policies, and from the United States. For this reason, the above-named institutions from these three countries have gathered to collaborate in research on nonproliferation and disarmament, including on how to devise measures for disarmament and for reduction of nuclear weapons. Joint proposals agreed as the result of this meeting will be presented to the international community.

 4. Further, using these proposals as a basis for discussion, they have agreed to ask research institutes in other countries for their views on the joint proposals and then to hold an international conference on "Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament" in Tokyo in autumn this year with major research institutions from ten or so other countries.

 Joint Proposal of the Three Institutes

Introduction

A decade after the end of the Cold War and half a century after a nuclear weapon was used as an instrument of war, the world has grown complacent about the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the need for the highest security for nuclear weapons and materials. The explosion of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan in May 1998 reminds the world that the continuing reduction in nuclear weapons as witnessed over the past decade is not inevitable, neither is the commitment of the nations of the world to nuclear disarmament universal. To prevent the world from returning to nuclear terror and dissuade the resumption of nuclear weapons expansion by any nation, all nations must again summon the will and the resources required to rid the world of these weapons.

I. Confronting Immediate Challenges to the Global Nuclear Order

 A. Preserving and Strengthening the International Nonproliferation Regime

The international nonproliferation regime is presently being threatened in several fundamental ways. Failure to address these challenges could weaken or jeopardize international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Effective action is required in several areas:

1.Preventing a Nonproliferation Disaster via Nuclear Leakage from the Former Soviet Union.

The insecurity of fissile material in the former Soviet Union (particularly in Russia) represents a very serious challenge to the international nonproliferation regime. Large-scale leakage of weapons, materials, or expertise from the former Soviet Union would seriously damage, or perhaps even destroy, the nonproliferation regime by making weapons capabilities available to potential proliferators, both state and non-state actors.

* Stabilizing the Russian nuclear sector is one of the key challenges for the period immediately ahead.

* Contributing to the enhancement of nuclear security in the former Soviet Union should be an urgent priority of all states that possess the financial or technical ability to help. International engagement must be increased if this problem is to be addressed successfully.

2.Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Members of the treaty, in particular the nuclear weapon states (namely China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) should do more to implement the treaty. It is especially important that they observe Article 6, which calls for good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament. NPT members should also call upon India, Pakistan, and Israel to join the NPT.

* The Review Conference in the year 2000 should be taken as an opportunity to reassess and strengthen the NPT.

* India and Pakistan should immediately join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without conditions, and the nations concerned should do their best to bring about the early entry into force of the CTBT.

* On-going negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to cut off further production of weapon-grade nuclear material should be vigorously pursued with well-defined strict international verification measures.

* Coping with the Enforcement Crisis: Iraq and North Korea have challenged the international nonproliferation regime by pursuing illegal nuclear weapons programs. Failure to successfully address these challenges will be a serious blow to the regime. However, the international community has been indecisive in response to the need to enforce the NPT provisions. The international community must resolve to employ effective sanctions in response to unambiguous violations.

* Other measures to prevent the undesirable spread of technology related to weapons of mass destruction such as Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the London Guidelines for non-proliferation of nuclear technology and others must be strictly observed by all nations concerned and updated where necessary.

B. Reviving the Arms Reduction Process

The negotiation and fulfillment of nuclear arms control treaties over the past decade has made a valuable contribution to worldwide efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and increase stability. However, arms control progress, as represented in the START II Treaty, is stalled and its future is uncertain for both political and financial reasons.

1. Promoting the ratification of START II

The failure to complete ratification of START II and to bring this treaty into force represents a significant challenge to the momentum of nuclear arms reduction. It is of the highest priority, not only for the nations directly involved, that START II should be immediately ratified and all arms reduction called for in the treaty be achieved upon Entry into Force.

* Upon Entry into Force, the international community should feel an obligation to assure the availability of the necessary resources so that the parties can fulfill all treaty obligations.

2. Initiating the negotiation of START III and other parallel measures

The proposals of President Clinton and President Yeltsin at their summit in Helsinki in 1997 to move well beyond START II should be energetically pursued through negotiations, and universally supported.

* The US and Russia should urgently negotiate an appropriate treaty agreement and bring this treaty into force. The commitment to verifiable reduction of nuclear warheads by the parties is a vital step toward a comprehensive warhead control regime.

* Unilateral steps in nuclear arms control have proven valuable in creating the climate for successful negotiations and should be pursued by all states along the models of the United Kingdom and France.

* It is in the direct interest of international security that the US, Russia, and all states possessing nuclear weapons to enact steps to reduce the numbers of these weapons and to assure adequate safeguards for existing weapons and materials.

C. Promoting Stable, Proliferation Resistant Regional Nuclear Orders

Regional tensions and conflicts in East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, and Eastern Europe can, unless managed very carefully, lead to action/reaction patterns for use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. Close consultation and prompt action including proper confidence building measures are required of all the nations involved. Informal dialogue will be a useful instrument for these purposes.

 II. Medium Term Objectives

 Notwithstanding all efforts at nonproliferation, nuclear weapons will remain a reality in international relations for the years to come. Even the emergence of new nuclear states cannot be excluded. Hence the challenge is not only to limit the spread of nuclear weapons but also to prevent the actual use of an atomic explosive--be it inadvertent or as an intentional aggressive act. The nuclear powers should help to reduce the risks of accidental nuclear detonations by significantly de-alerting their nuclear forces. In addition, nuclear deterrence needs to be preserved as one possible option to keep other countries from using (or threatening to use) weapons of mass destruction.

The international community should urgently consider and announce appropriate, coordinated responses to any actual use of nuclear weapons both to deter any consideration of this option and to assure swift and resolute action should deterrence fail.

 A. Beyond START III

In response to legal and moral obligations, the nuclear powers should enter into multilateral arms control negotiations. This will increase the confidence of the international community and improve the credibility of the nuclear weapons states. It will further reduce the incentives for non-nuclear weapon states to pursue the acquisition of these weapons.

* The proposed steps in START III for verifiable accountability and elimination of nuclear warheads should be but the first step in the establishment of a universal and comprehensive warhead control regime. Without this regime, efforts to expand nuclear arms treaties beyond Russia and the United States and to achieve further reductions are in jeopardy.

B. The Need to Deepen, Widen, and Institutionalize Transparency

All of the above-mentioned processes should be accompanied by transparency requirements. As numbers of weapons are reduced, increased specificity is required in defining and accounting for these weapons. The distinction between tactical and strategic warheads, deployed and non-deployed systems is diminished. There are also problems in definitions of such concepts as what constitutes a nuclear explosion.

All procedures for the removal of nuclear warheads from their deployed positions, from transportation and interim storage to their final dismantlement and disposition of special nuclear material contained therein, should be made transparent so that the objectives may be understood and addressed.

* All international arrangements for nonproliferation and elimination should be subject to clearly defined international verification measures, the results of which are made available to all.

* All nations should be required to state the number and kind of nuclear weapons (strategic, theater , or tactical) in their possession, as well as spares, parts, and components.

* Definition of what constitutes a nuclear explosion should be precisely stated, so that so-called stockpile stewardship and maintenance research and development may not be diverted as a means for improving nuclear weapons design.

III. Long-Term Vision

 Preparing a Framework Convention on Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

 Nuclear nonproliferation and weapons elimination involve many complicated steps, some of which (but not all) have been discussed in this paper. In addition, there are other measures such as preventing the undesirable spread of technology related to weapons of mass destruction--the Missile Technology Control Regime, the London Guidelines for nonproliferation of nuclear technology, and others. Rather than try to write an all-embracing international treaty, it will be more practical to conceive of an umbrella convention, and let individual protocols work out details and specific numbers. In the case of nuclear weapons, Resolution A/RES/53/77U "Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," 1998 UN General Assembly, introduced by Japan and adopted with 160 in favor, none against, and 11 abstentions, should be a good starting point. The wording of the Resolution could be adapted, and it could be made clear that the framework will work as a basic multilateral forum for housing separate protocols as signed and ratified by interested parties, and cover most of the items that have been discussed in this paper. Matters that are purely military in nature will not belong to the main convention.

* Work should begin immediately to draft a multilateral framework convention for nuclear disarmament with a view to timely elimination of nuclear weapons in all the states of the world.