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“How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World”

By
Dr. Carolina G. Hernandez
President
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies
Philippine
Introduction

This presentation is an ASEAN view of how Japan can contribute to a peaceful world. It leaves the discussion of domestic debates and discourses on Japan’s security perceptions, and amending its constitution to the Japanese colleague in this panel. It also addresses the question of Japan’s security perceptions and basic security policy for the future only as relevant in the thrust of this presentation. It argues that Japan’s constructive role in comprehensive security focused on economic cooperation since the 1970s had earned the trust of many of its neighbors, particularly in Southeast Asia. However, contemporary imperatives at home and abroad point to the need for a new security role for Japan. Here its partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would be a key component, having had three decades of working together in inter-regional reconciliation that could form the core of Japan’s new security role, one that could be acceptable to East Asia and to the rest of the world.

Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Security Relations

During two decades of the postwar era until 1991, Japan’s security role in the world had been defined by the concept of “comprehensive security” where the military or defense dimensions were confined to homeland security. Like ASEAN, Japan crafted the concept of comprehensive security to be able to play a regional security role other than in the military and defense dimensions. For its part, ASEAN sought to insulate Southeast Asia from superpower competition, to build friendly and cooperative relations among the countries in the region, including those in Northeast and South Asia, the broader Asia Pacific, as well as Europe. Hence, its dialogue partnership with the advanced industrial and democratic countries saw Japan as its earliest partner. That robust relationship has

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lasted more than three decades and has now entered the next thirty years with the agreements reached on the occasion of the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2003 as its new foundations.

ASEAN views security as multidimensional and multilevel, with the defense and military dimension as only one among others such as political stability, economic development, social harmony, and even environmental protection. It also believes that only by keeping each of the ASEAN members’ houses in order can a stable, peaceful, and prosperous regional order be realized. It is, therefore, the first task of each member country to achieve national resilience by addressing the causes of insecurity from within their respective societies. The priority given to domestic security was also shaped by the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s communist insurgency and other domestic armed conflicts were the primary security threats faced by the five original ASEAN member countries, in addition to underdevelopment, poverty, and social inequality.

Composed of small and medium-sized states, ASEAN has not aspired to acquire a great power role. It simply sought to have a credible voice in the shaping of the regional order where its equidistant approach to relations with the great powers would insulate its members from great power rivalry while benefiting from cooperative relations with them. In this regard, ASEAN has scored quite a good record of accomplishment in its 37-year life.

When the cold war ended and the old balance of power that secured the stability of the world also came to an end, ASEAN led in the establishment of a regional security dialogue. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to deal with security issues in the Asia Pacific thus came to life. It was the only regional actor that could be trusted to take this kind of initiative since none of the region’s great powers - the US, Japan, China, Russia, and India - enjoyed the level of confidence of all the relevant strategic players in the region as did ASEAN. Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the ASEAN region

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2 Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines (Diliman), and Founding President and Chair, Board of Directors, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. (ISDS Philippines).
became the economically fastest growing region in the world, a fact that helped in the birthing of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Hence, ASEAN’s comprehensive security and the policy of equidistant relations with all the great powers, plus its role in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict of the late 1970s through the next decade and a half had secured for it a credible position in the region.

Japan also developed its own concept of comprehensive security. In spite of its huge potentials even in the wake of extensive devastation caused by the past war, its peace constitution and lack of a sufficient web of constructive relations with others in the region, including in Southeast Asia hindered its ability to play a security role in the traditional sense. Its peace constitution authorized the establishment of an armed force solely for homeland self-defense purposes. Its four nuclear principles inhibited its evolution as a nuclear-weapons state. Its neighbors in Northeast and Southeast Asia continued to harbor deep suspicions and even hostility in some cases due to their unfortunate histories. All of these inhibited the emergence of postwar Japan as a “normal” state.

The rise of communism on the Chinese mainland and its spread to the former Indochinese states amidst the cold war competition between the US and the Soviet Union provided the opportunity for Japan’s economic and political recovery with US blessings and support. By the 1960s, Japan emerged as a major economic power that was ready to play a regional and international role. However, it was inhibited from becoming a political-security player, especially in the traditional sense. The definition of comprehensive security was an avenue in which it could “normalize” its relations, particularly with its Southeast Asian neighbors, many of whom were non-communist states. When ASEAN was established, its emphasis on intra-regional reconciliation must have been attractive to Tokyo and its comprehensive security concept was one Japan could understand. Like the ASEAN countries, Japan viewed security as comprehensive, consisting of economic, political, social, and other dimensions.
When its poorer Southeast Asian neighbors launched its dialogue partnership, Japan was the first to respond in a very positive way, focusing its area of cooperation in the less sensitive economic and functional fields. Its official development assistance (ODA) focused on infrastructure development while its trade relations helped the Southeast Asian economies of primary producers to export their goods to Japan, particularly in areas where Japan needed them most, such as in oil and timber.

From Japan’s perspective their trade and investment relations had four dimensions. These are: (1) Japan depends on less developed countries (LDCs) as sources of raw materials and markets for Japanese products; (2) the shipping lanes passing through ASEAN are crucial for Japan’s economy; (3) Southeast Asia is crucial in solving the problems between developed (North) and developing (South) countries; and (4) Southeast Asian security and stability are vital for Japan’s comprehensive security.  

Their three decades of constructive and mutually beneficial relations demonstrate how reconciliation between former “enemies” can be transformed to one that has evolved from mutual economic benefit, to better understanding of each other, to financial aid and assistance as a means to promote economic and political stability, and to regional cooperation as strategic partners. This relationship was not without problems, as in the beginning Japan’s economic overtures were viewed in Southeast Asia with suspicion, its height being the violent student demonstrations in Bangkok and Jakarta during the visit of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1974, and to this day, Japan has not apologized for wartime atrocities, including the issue of comfort women. On the whole, however, their partnership is a best practice in international relations that could serve as an example for Japan’s reconciliation with its Northeast Asian neighbors, a condition so essential in building an East Asia community with the ASEAN+3 process as a starting point.

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4 Akrasanee and Prasert, in *ibid.*, p. 63.
Japan as a Comprehensive Security Actor in Southeast Asia

Constrained by its peace constitution, its Self-Defense Forces were limited to the defense of the national territory. Its security policy however has been informed by both domestic and external factors leading to incremental shifts in defense policy over time. These factors include (1) the end of the cold war, (2) continuing sources of instability in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula, (3) the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially in two Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons states China and Russia, and North Korea’s refusal to abandon its nuclear-weapons production program; (4) increasing threats from transnational crime and other non-traditional security challenges, and of late (5) the prominence of the threat of international terrorism.\(^6\) Three important foundations continue to underpin Japan’s security policy. These are “(1) the maintenance of US-Japan security alliance; (2) the build-up of Japan’s defense capability; and (3) the use of diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and stability”.\(^7\)

For many years, Japan’s defense budget was pegged at a ceiling of 1 percent of GNP, even as this put Japan as among the biggest defense spender in the world due to the size of its economy that was second only to that of the US. The role of the SDF was strictly for the defense of the national territory and its weapons system was also for self-defense. As already noted, three non-nuclear principles – non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction into Japan - further constrained defense policy.

The main focus of its comprehensive security role was in trade and investments and development assistance especially to its Southeast Asian neighbors whose close ties

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\(^5\) Masashi Nishihara, “Japan’s Political and Security Relations with ASEAN”, in ASEAN-Japan Cooperation: A Foundation for East Asian Community, pp.155-156.


to the US - particularly during the Vietnam war - enabled them to acquire modern economic and social infrastructure as foundations for successful economic development.

Thus it was that when ASEAN was established in 1967, Japan used the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia as the basis of bilateral relations with ASEAN. While welcoming Japanese ODA, ASEAN countries continued to worry about Japanese economic domination. Despite however of the trade frictions of the 1970s, by 1977 aided by the end of the Vietnam war, ASEAN adopted economic development as its priority for which Japan’s economic assistance was critically important. When Japanese manufacturing structure moved toward high-technology production and labor prices went up, ASEAN became a natural destination for production activities of Japanese firms that saw a comparative advantage in moving part of their operations in Southeast Asia. Japan’s overflow of FDIs, and transfer of technology and management skills to its neighbors thus contributed hugely towards making the region economically competitive by the 1980s and 1990s.

When the financial crisis struck, Japan also took an active role in assisting ASEAN countries severely affected by it. Japan proposed the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, it announced a Special Yen Loan Facility of Y600 billion to stimulate employment and economic reforms, and offered an economic recovery package in the amount of US$30 billion under the New Miyazawa Initiative to help ASEAN countries. It also concentrated its ODA to ASEAN, especially its new members to narrow the ASEAN divide. In November 1999, the Obuchi Initiative targeted human resource development and exchange in East Asia, building social safety nets, cooperation for the development of ASEAN, reinforce the revitalization of ASEAN economies, and meet the challenges of the information age, as well as combat piracy. In July 2001, Japan reiterated four fields of cooperation with ASEAN; in January 2002, Koizumi proposed the concept of an East Asian Community; in November 2002 Japan and ASEAN signed the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Economic Partnership, promised Y200 billion in ODA to ASEAN for
educational purposes in the next five years, and in 2003 the Japan-ASEAN year ended with the commemorative summit that launched their new partnership in the new millennium.

In the political-security field, Japan has slowly been shifting its policy of self-inhibition to one of willing participant in regional security cooperation. In the 1980s, due to increasing Japanese concerns over piracy in the SLOCs, the scope of maritime self-defense was extended to cover 1,000 nautical miles from its national territory. This raised serious concern among its Northeast and Southeast Asian neighbors fearing a departure from self-defense and a risk of the resurgence of Japanese “militarism”. This was followed by the breaching of the ceiling on defense expenditures that went beyond 1 percent of GNP. In the 1996, the US-Japan Declaration on Security was also seen as further evidence of Japan’s emerging security role in the traditional field. A new law was enacted to implement this joint declaration, authorizing the SDF to provide logistical support in non-combat areas for US forces operating near Japan’s national territory. China took this to include contingencies such as conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the event of the US involvement in cross strait conflict should Taiwan declare independence and Beijing suppresses this by force.

Nevertheless, although there is suspicion by China and South Korea about any move that in their view would lead to Japanese “militarism”, on the whole they have not opposed Japan’s increasing involvement by the SDF in peacekeeping operations outside the Japanese homeland. In response to domestic and external imperatives, since 1991, Japan’s political security role began to change: (1) it dispatched several minesweeping ships of the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) to the Persian Gulf in 1991; (2) it participated for the first time in UNPKO under the UNTAC in Cambodia in 1992 by sending 600 troops there; (3) it sent 700 SDF members to East Timor in 2002; (4) it enacted a special law in 2001 to allow the SDF to participate in the global campaign

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8 A summary of Japan-ASEAN cooperation in trade and investment and ODA is found in Akrasanee and Prasert, “The Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Economic Cooperation”, pp. 63-74.
9 Nishihara, “Japan’s Political and Security Relations with ASEAN”, p. 154.
against terrorism that enabled the MSDF to supply fuel for the naval forces of other nations in the coalition operating in the Indian Ocean; and (5) it enacted another special law enabling Japan to dispatch SDF troops to Iraq with a specifically non-military mission in non-combat areas.\textsuperscript{11}

Another evidence of Japan’s shifting political-security role is its bids since July 1993 to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and to this end has argued the need for UN reform and sought the support of its friends and allies, including ASEAN countries. The then Prime Minister Miyazawa declared “Japan is ready to take as much responsibility as it is capable of”. Subsequent addresses to the UN General Assembly by Japan’s prime ministers since then carried the same message, to wit: Hosokawa said in 1993, “Japan is ready to take as much responsibility as it can in a reformed United Nations”: Hashimoto said in 1996, “Japan is prepared to fulfill its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council”; Koizumi said, “I believe that we should now focus our discussion on such questions as the number of seats on the enlarged Security Council in September 2002, and then in September 2004, “We believe that the role that Japan has placed provides a solid basis for its assumption of permanent membership on the Security Council”. He stressed that 2005, when the UN celebrates its 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary would be a fitting occasion for “changes on all fronts… the Security Council in particular”. He also argued for the removal of the “enemy state” clauses in the UN Charter referring to enemies of the Allied Powers in World War II including Japan and Germany.\textsuperscript{12}

In its bid for UN reform and Security Council membership, it is likely that Japan would receive the diplomatic support of ASEAN member states.

\textsuperscript{10} Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, “ASEAN’s Political and Security Relations with Japan”, in \textit{ASEAN-Japan Cooperation: A Foundation of East Asian Community}, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{11} Nishihara, “Japan’s Political and Security Relations with ASEAN”, pp. 154-155.
Imperatives for Japan’s New Security Role in the 21st Century

A new political-security role for Japan in the 21st century is driven by a number of important factors, some internal, but others external. They are discussed at great length in the October 2004 report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities already cited above. The following is a brief discussion of what this author thinks are among the most important imperatives:

1. *The end of the cold war* - As already noted, the uncertainties of the post cold war world had led Japan to review its security policy, seeking to sustain its security alliance with the US. This is seen in their Joint Declaration in 1996 that defined burden sharing, among other dimensions of their security cooperation. Japan also collaborated with ASEAN in launching the ASEAN Regional Forum for political-security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.

2. *The rise of China* – In a matter of two decades, China’s phenomenal rise as an economic powerhouse has enormously boosted its capacity to meet its four modernization goals. There are positive predictions that it would surpass the US economy in another decade, and Taiwan’s defense capability in a couple of years. ASEAN’s loss of economic competitiveness to China’s market of more than 1.2 billion people and of Japan’s lost decade that paved the way for China’s attractiveness to ASEAN and other neighbors are only some of the other manifestations of this rise of China.

China’s rise was also marked by significant improvements in US-China relations, no doubt shaped by economic forces and the global terrorist threat, although in the long run, they are likely to remain strategic competitors. China has also challenged Japan, long an ASEAN strategic partner (for having both been non-communist, open economies, and reliant on US security umbrella since the

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end of World War II), but whose overall position relative to China has been eroded largely by the consequences of Japan’s lost decade and unfinished economic liberalization. China’s entry in the global market with its large economy, huge share of world trade, and specialization in almost every level of technological progress has exerted a tremendous impact on every major economic region in the world including East Asia.

3. *Reduced threat perceptions about China by ASEAN countries* – China’s rise and its diplomatic offensive vis-à-vis ASEAN have helped moderate ASEAN countries’ perceptions about China as a security threat. ASEAN countries severely affected by the 1997 financial crisis appreciated China’s decision not to revalue the renminbi.

ASEAN claimants in the contested features in the South China Sea also appreciated growing Chinese moderation in its behavior from the 1980s armed conflict with Vietnam, the occupation of and military build up in the Mischief Reef between 1995 and 1998, and its overall creeping occupation, to a more accommodating posture as seen in the adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN in 2002. Although the latter falls short of a binding code of conduct, ASEAN was able to get China and Malaysia to accept the principle of no new occupation, a necessary element to stabilize the contested area.

In 2001, China also concluded a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation agreement with ASEAN that prompted Japan to launch its own bid for an ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2002. China’s ASEAN diplomacy has succeeded in eroding ASEAN solidarity to the extent that each major ASEAN country has regarded relations with China, if not the most important at least among their top three foreign policy priorities. Of late, China has also seriously engaged the Philippines in crafting closer defense cooperation
in an obvious bid to wean it from its close security relationship with the US and close comprehensive security relationship with Japan.

Tokyo cannot afford to have its close relations with ASEAN undermined by Chinese “diplomatic victories” as described above. Although both countries are part of the ASEAN+3 process and are regarded by ASEAN member states as key to a stable, peaceful, and prosperous regional order, in the long run, the strategic interests of Beijing and Tokyo are likely to compete, if not clash. Mindful of that future scenario, Japan needs to catch up with China in the defense and security field, after China has begun to overtake Japan in the economic field where Japan was pre-eminent among Northeast and Southeast Asian economies in the past. The attractive Chinese market and its contribution to the economic recovery of ASEAN member states are among the reasons behind ASEAN member states warming up to Beijing.

4. *International terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs* – Following the attacks against the US on 11 September 2001, US allies and countries throughout the world with a domestic problem perceived to be linked to the global terrorist movement have become members of the global coalition against terrorism in varying degrees. This problem has led Japan to adopt in 2001 a special legislation enabling Japan to join in the international campaign against terrorism, paving the way for the sending of the MSDF as a refueling force in the Indian Ocean for coalition members engaged in operations against al-Qaeda forces.

The concern that terrorist and other groups could use weapons of mass destruction to attack the US and its allies and friends has also led Japan to join in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) with other like-minded countries in the region. Eleven nations signed the Statement of Interdiction Principles on 4 September 2003 and by 1 June 2004, the PSI core group has reached 17 with 60
other countries signaling their interest to supporting PSI activities.\footnote{The Military Balance 2004-2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2004), p. 19.} Joint exercises of PSI countries have in fact been held in Japan in 2004. Only Japan and Singapore so far have joined the PSI among East Asian countries.

At the same time, Pyongyang’s recalcitrance about its nuclear-weapons development program has increased Japan’s concern over WMD proliferation. It does not help that South Korea has also reportedly been engaged in nuclear weapons development in an obvious bid to enhance its security\textit{vis-à-vis} North Korea and other parties.

5. \textit{Rise of transnational crime, especially piracy and illegal trafficking in drugs, small arms and light weapons, as well as human beings, particularly women and children} – Japan’s strategic interests include the safety of international navigation, particularly of the SLOCs through which critical oil resources from the Middle East and Southeast Asia pass and through which its exports of manufactures are transported to their foreign markets. Piracy and armed robbery at sea constitutes one of the most important threats to the safety of the SLOCs. Southeast Asia’s international waterways had reportedly seen the most number of piratical attacks. For example, in 2000, 262 out of 469 of these incidents in the world occurred in Southeast Asia, while 189 out of the world’s total of 445 incidents also took place in this region.\footnote{14} These numbers are to be regarded as conservative counts, given the fact that many such incidents are unreported.

The oceans are also used by transnational criminal organizations in the illegal trafficking of drugs, small arms and light weapons, and human beings. Southeast Asian countries are major producers, transshipment points, and destination of illegal drugs, including heroin and “ice”. They are also very much part of the small arms and light weapons illicit trade where Cambodia and
Vietnam are suppliers to local armed insurgencies in Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Southern Thailand, as well as to transnational criminal groups. The region is also one of the principal sources, transshipment point, and destination of trafficked human beings, particularly women and children. China is also involved in these types of transnational crime, and Japan could be a destination country for trafficked women.¹⁵

In this regard, Japan cannot be immune to the threats posed to regional security by these transnational criminal activities in which some of its own criminal groups could also be involved. Thus, it has engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation in coast guard policing to enhance maritime safety and security with a number of neighbors, including ASEAN member states.

6. *Rise of human security issues and humanitarian disasters* – Already an advocate of comprehensive security, Japan also adopted human security as a framework for non-traditional security cooperation with other countries. It set up a Trust Fund for Human Security that provided Y100 million to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to help rebuild the agricultural capacity of communities in Burundi whose peoples were internally displaced or repatriated from Tanzania. It also pledged the same amount to assist farmers in Sierra Leone. The Trust Fund for Human Security has also helped the FAO to implement the New Rice for Africa (NERICA) Program.¹⁶

In response to humanitarian disasters such as in East Timor and under the UN auspices, Japan has also been willing to participate in responding to this type

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¹⁵ See Carolina G. Hernandez, “Transnational Crime in East Asia: Illegal Traffic in Drugs, Natural Persons, and Small Arms and Light Weapons”, a paper presented at the 2nd Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium, organized by the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies hosted by Japan’s MOFA, Singapore, 27-28 October 2004, for a fuller discussion of these forms of transnational crime in which Japan-ASEAN security cooperation can be built.

of emergencies. It sent a PKO contingent in East Timor tasked with non-combat duties. This role is likely to grow in the future, given its identification in the two Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium and Workshops of their Team of Experts as directed by *The Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action* attached to *The Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium* adopted at their commemorative summit in December 2003.

7. *Reform of multilateral institutions* – The inability and/or weakness of the United Nations to fulfill its primary goal of maintaining international peace and security has been traced to the structure of world politics dominated by the cold war during its first fifty years. The assumptions behind the founding of the UN are also no longer realistic in the present century. These include the definition of the great powers that had a permanent membership in the Security Council, the structure of power in the world in 1945, the response to conflict as either pacific settlement under Chapter 6 or action with regard to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and the need to ensure that “enemy states” remained outside of the UN system, among others. These assumptions have contributed to the limited effectiveness of the UN to deliver on its functions. Thus, there is a need to reform the UN system, including permanent membership for Japan in the Security Council.

Moreover, US hegemony has also reduced the authority of the UN to deal with peace and security. Time and again, the US has either not sought authority from the Security Council to undertake action against presumed disturbers of the peace such as in Kosovo and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In both instances, international norms embodied in instruments such as the UN have been eroded.

8. *Domestic imperatives* – Within Japan, public opinion has also been changing with regard to the country’s security role. Of late, there appears an increasing willingness to venture into security terrains not traveled in the past, including since 1991, peacekeeping operations, participation in the global campaign against
terrorism, non-combat support for armed operations against new “enemies” such as al-Qaeda, and preemptive interdiction to prevent the movement of WMDs into Japan and the region under the PSI.

As already noted, in order to remove the constraints inhibiting a greater security role, Japan has enacted special legislation to enable its SDF to undertake security tasks beyond the defense of the homeland. Moreover, Japan’s citizens have become increasingly willing to have their country evolve into a “normal” state, including through the amendment of its peace constitution. To build confidence, it is wise to involve its friends and allies in the evolution of Japan’s new security role.

How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World

From the above discussion, it is clear that Japan’s national interest would include both traditional and non-traditional security concerns, and would adopt a mix of traditional, comprehensive, and human security perspectives in the security role it could play in the future. While it will remain burdened by its historical past, especially in Northeast Asia where a consensus on the interpretation of their common history has remained elusive, a carefully crafted new security role for Japan can be acceptable to most countries in the region. Japan has to make genuine efforts at reconciliation by apologizing for its behavior in World War II. It also needs to make reparation to wounded parties, such as the comfort women of Asia who are slowly but surely dieing away.

Short of this or preferably in combination with it, Japan can begin healing the wounds, already underway in Southeast Asia by undertaking a joint project with its Northeast and Southeast Asian neighbors to study their common past in the effort to build consensus on this issue and to teach what the joint study would have learned to their future generation. A rewritten common regional history is a project long overdue if Japan’s new security role were to face smooth sailing in the region and if its call to build an East Asian community were not to have a hollow ring to it. It remains true that
inasmuch as most of Southeast Asia’s people have forgiven the past, there are still pockets of powerful public opinion where Japan’s wartime policies are recalled whenever opposing Japanese-initiated policies or seeking Japanese support for initiatives and policies other countries wish to advance that would involve Japan.

Japan also needs to consult with its neighbors on the evolution of its new security role as part of trust and confidence building among them. The present conference and the series of Japan-ASEAN Security Symposium and Workshops of their Team of Experts sponsored by Japan’s MOFA through the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and Singapore’s Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) are very important examples of this suggested policy approach.

It would also help to build its new security role by starting with the non-traditional security fields such as combating transnational crime, including piracy and armed robbery at sea before going to traditional security activities, such the deployment of its armed forces in combat missions abroad, and to undertake security activities in partnership with other countries.

In particular, Japan’s interest in association with its friends and partners in the region could be benefited immensely if its new security role would be hewn as closely as possible to the points already discussed above and expressed in the following approaches:

1. Sustain Japan’s focus on comprehensive and cooperative security
2. Develop further a human security perspective to guide Japan’s foreign and security policy
3. Evolve a new security policy in non-threatening ways, by starting with less sensitive non-traditional security areas before going into the more politically sensitive traditional security areas
4. Collaborate with others in an equal, mutually beneficial, and symmetrical manner
5. Cooperate with like-minded partners in restoring the credibility and authority of multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations beginning with the much-needed reforms in its structure and roles.

6. Work closely with trusted partners such as ASEAN who do not aspire to a great power role, and in particular help build their capacity for enhanced security cooperation.

**Japan-ASEAN Partnership as a Critical Component of Japan’s New Security Role**

From an ASEAN perspective, there is merit in making the Japan-ASEAN partnership as a critical component of Japan’s new security role for the following reasons:

1. Their three decades of close cooperation guided by comprehensive security are a strong argument that given the political will and a balanced mutually advantageous framework for cooperation, former adversaries can become strategic partners.

2. ASEAN’s track record as a credible external actor, although somewhat eroded by the consequences of the financial crisis can be used to lend credibility to, and therefore acceptability of Japan’s new security role. Put differently, ASEAN can serve once again its earlier function of interlocutor for a Japan that had little trust from its neighbors.

3. ASEAN is a medium-sized actor and poses no threat to anyone in the region. In fact, because of this character, it had been sought not only by Japan, but also more recently and to an increasing extent by China in the achievement of Beijing’s regional political and strategic objectives.

4. ASEAN and Japan have complementary capacities for security cooperation as seen in their complementary economies whose different levels of development also have created complementarities in the security field. For example, Japan’s superior
defense technology and excess resources can be used to upgrade ASEAN’s capacity for security cooperation. Enhanced security capacity among ASEAN countries would improve their ability to provide maritime safety and security to keep the SLOCs free and safe from hostile forces. Likewise, in the combating various forms of transnational crime, Japan’s superior technology to detect and deter crime can help build similar capacities in ASEAN in the areas of money laundering, document fraud, external control procedures, etc.

5. Japan and ASEAN member countries have also participated in PKO activities under the United Nations. Regional PKO training, including interoperability and development of a common set of doctrines compatible with those of UN PKO can be an area of Japan’s security role where ASEAN is a partner.

In this regard, the set of recommendations developed for the governments of Japan and ASEAN member countries by the Team of Experts in August and October 2004\textsuperscript{17} merits support from both sides. As a whole, these recommendations can be the starting point for the evolution of Japan’s new security role in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, measures in which ASEAN is also involved as a security partner.

\textsuperscript{17} The set of recommendations will be submitted to the governments of Japan and ASEAN member countries through their SOM for the consideration of the leaders of these countries at their Summit in November 2004.