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Introduction

The demise of the Cold War and domestic changes associated with the collapse of the 1955 regime have released the Japanese from some of the long-standing post-War taboos, including the debate on the revision of the Article of the postwar Constitution. In addition, security threats posed by a series of North Korean provocations, such as intrusion by spy ships, the launch of the Teapodon missile, and the abduction of Japanese citizens, have steadily aroused Japanese consciousness about its own national security.

Under these circumstances, many external observers have seen Japan's growing eagerness to play an active security role in the post-Cold War era as reflecting its ambition to become a “normal” great power, including in the military domain. Along this line of argument, many characterize the nature of Japan’s changes as a move toward the “right,” and predict an intensifying Sino-Japanese rivalry, both economic and geopolitical, as a central component of an East Asian order in coming decades.

The net effect of this phenomenon, however, has been mixed at best. This paper argues that a most conspicuous change in Japan's foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War has occurred in three forms/domains: deeper engagement in international security, the rise of human security, and the most recent case of renewed interest in regional integration and community building. Domestic changes in Japan's foreign policy parameters, although some of which may indeed be associated with the surge of nationalism of a kind, have in effect prompted Japanese deeper
engagement in these regional and global affairs.

Of particular importance in the Japanese context is the persistent strength of “pacifism” as the most critical reference point informing the content and the policy-making process of security policy. After the end of the Cold War, Japan’s postwar pacifism has come under challenges from two fronts. First, the domain of traditional security has increased prominence, if only relatively, in Japanese security policy. Second, even liberals in the Japanese society have begun to question the wisdom of postwar pacifism by criticizing it as “one-country pacifism” and to argue for somewhat proactive pacifism.

In essence, the combined effect of these two general changes in the post-Cold War context of Japanese security policy is important in understanding why international and human security have taken firm root in Japanese foreign policy. For one thing, increased prominence of traditional security does not suggest by any means that traditional security concerns have come to dominate Japanese thinking and policy. It is a new addition, and not a replacement of anything, in Japan’s comprehensive approach to security, which, for some policy experts, should have been given due attention long time ago.

True, this new addition of traditional security has placed Japanese postwar pacifists on the defensive. This phenomenon, however, did not cause the eradication of pacifist elements, but rather the evolution of postwar pacifism into a new type of proactive pacifism with an internationalist bent. Greater participation in international peacekeeping operations, the rise of human security, and renewed attention to regional community building are clear cases of this internationalist pacifism of post-Cold War Japan. This is in parallel with, not despite, the somewhat natural rise of traditional security concerns against the North Korean threat as an explicit and immediate worry and the rise of China as a rather implicit and long-term concern.

**Awakening to International Security**

In the domain of international security, the 1991 Gulf War became a critical turning point awakening the Japanese government to the new realities after the end of the Cold War. The absolute humiliation resulting from the Japanese government’s incapacity, other than through “checkbook diplomacy,” to contribute to multinational
efforts to defeat Iraq was a central driving force behind the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in June 1992.

The passage of the law enabled the Japanese government to dispatch its Self-Defense Force (SDF) to the peace-keeping operations under the United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was followed by a series of dispatches of the SDF troops to a number of other UN PKOs including those in Zaire, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and East Timor.  

As Japan was making this significant engagement in international security for the first time after the end of the World War II, the monopoly of power by the LDP was broken in August 1993 with the birth of the Hosokawa government. When the desperate LDP came back to power with the Socialist Party head Murayama as Prime Minister of an LPD-led coalition government in June 1994, Murayama recognized the constitutionality of SDF and the legitimacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance, thus destroying his party's long-standing raison-d'etre. This led to the catastrophic demise of the Socialist Party, and the collapse of the so-called 1955 regime.

The demise of the leftist-pacifist political forces in domestic politics has changed the context of political discourse on security matters in a significant way. Most importantly, it lifted long-standing taboos in the debate about national and international security, including the issue of the Article Nine of the Japanese postwar constitution. Opinion polls indicate that in the 1990s many Japanese came to support the revision of the Article Nine because they felt that it prohibits Japan from “international contribution” such as participation in UN PKO.

The development in the direction of deeper engagement in international security has been systematic and steady, while responses in the domain of traditional national security have been sporadic. After all, the emphasis in the Ichiro Ozawa's theory of Japan as a “normal country” was also placed more on Japan's participation in international peace-keeping efforts than anything else.

While encouraging Japanese deeper participation in international security, new regional and global security challenges after the end of the Cold War also caused

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the re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance. The new Defense Program Outline, revised in November 1995, stressed, among others, a new role of SDF in international peace-keeping efforts, and an important role of the US-Japan alliance in these endeavors.3 Along this line of logic, the “US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security,” signed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton in April 1996, declared that “the Japan-U.S. security relationship ...... remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.”4

And yet, the 9.11 has opened up a new chapter for Japan’s coping with international security. Soon after the 9.11, the support of the international community for the United States was unmistakable. China agreed to the UN Security Council resolution allowing the U.S.-led multinational forces to engage in a war in Afghanistan, which became the first instance where China voted for the use of force by UN members against a sovereign state.5

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also supported the United States unequivocally. This was a natural act from the standpoint of Japanese engagement in international security whose momentum has been steadily on the rise in the 1990s. In fact, the anti-terrorism measures law, enacted speedily to dispatch Japanese SDF to logistical support in the Indian Ocean in the event of a war in Afghanistan, was legitimized in the name of the United Nations Charter and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and not the U.S.-Japan alliance.6

Here, the lesson from the 1991 Gulf War experiences was clearly at work. The nightmare for the Japanese government was to repeat “checkbook diplomacy.” Politically, the U.S. factor was not insignificant in the mind of central decision-makers, particularly Prime Minister Koizumi. In the end, it was fortunate for the Japanese government that the support for the United States did not contradict contribution to

international security in case of the war in Afghanistan.

This, however, was not necessarily the case regarding the war against Iraq. While the war in Afghanistan was a clear case of international security, the case of the Iraq war was complicated at best.

The Japanese government, too, was deeply annoyed by the unilateralism of the Bush administration to go to war against Iraq. It, therefore, hoped that some U.N. resolution would to be passed justifying the U.S. action. Unlike France or Germany, however, Japan does not have effective multilateral fora with which to deal with the United States. When time ran out, the Japanese government did not have any other means but to go along with the United States.

Beneath the surface, therefore, the implications of the Japanese support for the war in Afghanistan and the support for the U.S. war against Iraq are significantly different. The former was a clear case of international security recognized as such by the majority of the international community, whereas the latter was not. The case of the Iraq war has revealed that when and where there is a gap between the policy of the United States and the cause of international security, Japan would in the end have to follow the United States.

The Rise of Human Security

What is peculiarly Japanese in Japan’s context and approach to human security is that the motivation is closely connected with the desire to play a bigger role in international society under the assumption of proactive pacifism. It was in this context that Japanese efforts toward deeper engagement in international security through taking part in international peace-keeping operations can be regarded as a prelude to Japanese approach to human security.

Keizo Takemi, a scholar and a politician of the Upper House, who played a key role through his close tie with the late Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in the initial process of the rise of human security, explains as follows:

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Pacifism in Japan evolved into a highly ideological one-country pacifism that repudiated military force, based on deep reflection and contrition for the country's militaristic aggression toward its neighbors. However, with the collapse of the East-West cold war structure, one-country pacifism has been seen to gradually lose its relevance in the face of new realities, and its significance is receding in the minds of the younger generation of Japanese who themselves have had no direct experience of war.

What is now required of Japan is the formulation and projection of a new future-oriented pacifism that enhances and promotes Japan's standing as a responsible member of the international community. In the interconnected and people-oriented 21st century, the nebulous concept of one-country pacifism must be developed into peace diplomacy, where Japan focuses more on individual values. This is a task that the people of Japan themselves can engage in as they enlarge their role at the forefront of the international community based on the pillar of human security.

Takemi also states that “Events surrounding the currency and financial crises in Asia were the driving force behind Japan's move to highlight the negative aspects of globalization and the need to curb their effect.”

Takemi was an administrative vice-minister of Foreign affairs at the time of the Asian financial crisis as was an inspiration for then-Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi as his close aide.

In December 1998, Obuchi, now as Prime Minister, spoke to the “Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow,” sponsored by the Japan Center for International Exchange, where Obuchi elaborated the concept of human security as follows:

An unavoidable fact is that Asia's remarkable economic development in recent years also created social strains. The current economic crisis has aggravated those strains, threatening the daily lives of many people. Taking this fact fully into consideration, I believe that we must deal with these difficulties with due consideration for the socially vulnerable segments of population, in the light of "Human Security," and that we must seek new strategies for economic development which attach importance to human security with a view to enhancing the long term development of our region.

Obuchi then defined human security as follows:

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8 Ibid, p. 43.
It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired. While the phrase "human security" is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats.

Then, two weeks later on December 16 in Hanoi taking the opportunity of attending the ASEAN+3 Summit, Obuchi further advanced his concept of human security by saying that “At the same time, even in times of economic crisis, we should not forget cooperation on medium- and long-term problems such as environmental degradation, narcotics and international organized crime which need to be addressed if we wish to protect human survival, life and dignity.” For this purpose, Obuchi committed to contribute 500 million yen (US$ 4.2 million) for the establishment of the "Human Security Fund" under the United Nations (later renamed as the Trust Fund for Human Security) to promote human security projects by UN agencies around the world.10

Despite Obuchi’s sudden death in May 2000, the momentum on human security was kept by successive administrations. In his speech at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in September 200011, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, a successor to Obuchi, stressed that “With ‘human security’ as one of the pillars of its diplomacy, Japan will spare no effort to make the twenty-first century a human-centered century.” Mori expressed the intention of the Japanese government to contribute additional 10 billion yen (roughly US$100 million) to the "Human Security Fund" established at the United Nations in March 1999, on top of the already dispersed total amount of 9 billion yen (over US$80 million) since the Obuchi proposal. Mori also proposed the creation of “an international committee on human security,” which was realized as the Commission on Human Security as announced in January 2001 by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata in Tokyo. Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, served as co-chairs.

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Ogata, who served as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for one decade from 1990 to 2000, has served as a critical and effective linchpin connecting Japanese initiatives to the development at the level of international society. The effective linkage between the role of Ogata and the initiatives by the Japanese government was established at the occasion of the “International Symposium on Human Security: From the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit to UN Millennium Summit,” hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on July 28, 2000. As suggested by the subtitle, the symposium was held using the opportunity of the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit, held in Okinawa on July 21-13, and anticipating the UN Millennium Summit scheduled in September.

The event was crucial in advancing the Obuchi initiatives on human security into global agenda, particularly at the United Nations. The two keynote speakers were UNHCR Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen, who later assumed the co-chairs of the Commission on Human Security proposed by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori at the UN Millennium Summit. Ogata thus played a critical role as a catalyst in globalizing Obuchi’s initiatives onto the world stage.

**Toward an East Asian Community**

Just as the Asian financial crisis triggered the rise of human security as an important pillar of Japanese foreign policy, the crisis ushered in a new momentum toward deeper regional integration in which Japan has been a key player. One of the outcomes was the establishment of ASEAN+3 at the end of 1997, which has become a new basis of regional integration.

The initial move toward regional integration has been sustained by a series of FTA initiatives by the ASEAN+3 members. Singapore took an important initiative to officially propose a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan in December 1999 when Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong visited Japan. Japanese economic ministries, most notably the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which had already started to study such arrangements with South Korea and Mexico since 1998, responded positively and the negotiations gained momentum.

In the meantime, observing the momentum of a series of bilateral FTA initiatives and having achieved the goal of joining the WTO, China also came up with its own FTA initiative, as most symbolically indicated by the Chinese proposal of a free
trade agreement with ASEAN at the occasion of the ASEAN+3 summit meeting in November 2000. In the following year, Chinese and SEAN leaders reached a basic agreement that they would achieve a free trade area within the coming 10 years. This was quickly followed-up in November 2002, when the leaders signed a comprehensive framework agreement to carry out the plan.

These China-ASEAN initiatives have in turn prompted the Koizumi administration to develop its own regional strategy built upon the ongoing process of FTA negotiations. In Prime Minister Koizumi’s policy speech delivered in Singapore in January 2002, Koizumi proposed an “Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership,” built upon the “Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership,” the so-called Japan-Singapore FTA, which Koizumi signed prior to the speech.12

More importantly, the Koizumi proposal included an ambitious reference to an East Asian community. Koizumi said to the audience in Singapore that “our goal should be the creation of a community that acts together and advances together.” Koizumi expressed his expectation that, starting from Japan-ASEAN cooperation, “the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such a community.”

What was quietly implied in this presentation of policy approach is the weight of ASEAN as an equal partner for Japan’s regional strategy. This Koizumi initiative led to a bilateral ASEAN-Japan summit meeting held in Tokyo in December 2003. This was the very first occasion when the ASEAN countries agreed to hold such a meeting outside of Southeast Asia. Previously, any bilateral summit meeting between ASEAN and its non-member country used to be held in conjunction with the ASEAN leaders meetings or the ASEAN+3 meetings, which as a rule take place only in the Southeast Asian region.

As Japan rapidly moves into a highly aged society rather than reverting to a traditional great power, there is growing awareness among Japanese promoters of FTA and regional integration that many of the deep-seated challenges, including reforms of non-competitive sectors such as agriculture as well as entire economic and social systems, could not be met without harmonizing domestic reforms with the evolution of

12 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership,” (January 14, 2002). Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html
East Asian economic integration and community building. FTA with South Korea is next in line, and there is no reason to believe that WTO-compatible FTA between Japan and China could not be concluded forever.13

After all, Japanese changing security profiles after the end of the Cold War, more focused upon international security and human security, correspond to this overall direction of change.

**Conclusion: Redefining Japan’s Security Profile**

Skeptics may view Japanese dedication to international security, human security, and regional community building as only cosmetic, while believing that more important impulse relevant for traditional security should be encouraging Japan to become a traditional great power. This may well be dominant conventional wisdom among many experts on Asian security and Japanese diplomacy in the region. If preoccupied with this conventional wisdom, however, one can never understand what is really going on in Japan after the end of the Cold War, and its real implications for Japanese security policy as well as for a regional order.

The same applies to the debate about the Article Nine of the Japanese postwar constitution. Previously, saying that the revision should be debated sounded hawkish, but today, various opinion-makers and politicians have begun to debate alternative revisions with respective future images of Japan and its role in the region and the world.

For many in Japan, to change some of the postwar “abnormal” premises of security policy is in essence to become a “normal” country. Ichiro Ozawa started the argument soon after the end of the Cold War primarily with respect to UN peace-keeping operations, whose role became significant in the aftermath of the collapse of the Cold War structure.

13 Any comparison between Japan and China over FTA should pay due attention to the fact that China, as a developing country, is guarded by the enabling clause of the WTO treaty, which exempts her from complying with the no-exception rule in signing a free trade agreement. No-exception is understood to mean covering 90% of the trading goods in any bilateral free trade agreement, which is not usually met in case of Japan without including agricultural products. China, on its part, it not bound by the rule, and therefore could engage in somewhat discriminatory measures such as early harvests vis-à-vis ASEAN countries. In essence, the roles of Japan and China in regional FTA arrangements are complimentary rather than competitive.
In these shifting debates on Japanese security policy, somewhat rightist elements have found breathing space where they have begun to voice their beliefs and ideologies loudly. The phenomenon has proceeded side by side with the decline of leftist political forces, which used to be the political backbone of Japanese postwar pacifism.

In this process, postwar pacifism has not simply died away, but some elements of pacifism have found new forms of articulating their values and beliefs. They are usually proactive, seeking a global role, as most clearly represented by Yoichi Funabashi’s thesis of Japan as a global civilian power. In his theorization of Japan’s new security profile, participation in international peace keeping operations is an important defining factor. Human security is another case stimulated by the same impulse of proactive pacifism, as indicated by the words of Keizo Takemi introduced above.

Indeed, Obuch took the initiative in picking up and promoting the concept of human security along this line of thinking. This was also demonstrated by another important initiative of Obuchi’s in establishing Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century in 1999. Tadashi Yamamoto of JCCIE worked very closely with Obuchi in organizing the Commission, and the Commission report, published in January 2000 and titled *The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium*, picked up Funabashi’s concept of Japan as a global civilian power.

It is no secret that independence-oriented nationalists do not necessarily feel much sympathy with the liberal internationalism in Japan’s new security orientation. There is no evidence to suggest, however, that they have made any serious efforts, other than in mass media with a view to influencing the public opinion, to grab resources in the process of governmental policy-making away from these new security agenda to their own priority areas such as traditional defense build-up.

In sum, the Japanese government has picked up these new security and foreign policy agenda rather naturally, because it has suited its life-size profile as a non-unilateralist, not-threatening security actor.